As the Department of Labor’s (“DOL’s”) proposed fiduciary rule awaits final adoption, market participants are starting to predict how it will affect retirement investment advice given that financial advisers such as broker-dealers, investment advisers, insurance companies, and other financial institutions, as well as their representatives, may soon be subjected to heightened fiduciary standards. Specifically, the sale of annuity products is predicted to face a large amount of change given its commission-based nature.

Currently, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) and the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (“Code”), financial advisers are generally only fiduciaries if they provide investment advice or recommendations for compensation to employee benefit plans or participants and such advice is given on a regular basis and pursuant to a mutual understanding that the advice will serve as the primary basis for investment decisions and will be individualized to the particular needs of the plan. While investment advisers already have fiduciary duties under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the current narrow definition of fiduciary under ERISA and the Code generally does not encompass broker-dealers.

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Last month, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) brought and simultaneously settled administrative charges against an investment adviser and its owner for misleading clients regarding the historical performance of a private fund managed by the adviser and for making misleading statements regarding the fund’s investment strategy.  Specifically, the SEC announced it had settled an administrative proceeding on January 28, 2016, against QED Benchmark Management LLC and its owner, Peter Kuperman, in which administrative proceeding the SEC alleged that QED and Kuperman represented that they would follow a scientific stock selection strategy.

According to the SEC, QED deviated from that strategy, which deviation resulted in heavy losses to QED’s fund.  After experiencing the losses, according to the SEC allegations, QED and Kuperman provided investors in the fund with information about the fund’s performance and supported that misleading information with statements of returns that included both actual and hypothetical returns, in violation of SEC guidance prohibiting misleading performance advertising. Continue reading ›

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) recently filed its revised pay-to-play rules proposal with the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Investment advisers have been awaiting FINRA’s pay-to-play rules ever since the SEC announced last year that it would not recommend enforcement action against an investment adviser or its associated persons for the payment to a third party for the solicitation of a government entity for investment advisory services until either FINRA or the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”) had adopted its own pay-to-pay rules for broker-dealers.

Pay-to-play activities involve the practice of making cash or in kind contributions, or soliciting others to make those contributions, to state or local officials or other government entities as an incentive for the receipt of government contracts. Pursuant to Rule 206(4)-5, investment advisers are prohibited from providing a government entity with investment advisory services for compensation within two years of contributing monetarily to that government entity. In addition, and of particular interest here, under Rule 206(4)-5 investment advisers may not provide payment to any third party to solicit a government entity for investment advisory services on behalf of the investment adviser unless that third party is a registered investment adviser, a registered broker-dealer, or a registered municipal adviser.

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The Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) of the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) recently released its Examination Priorities for 2016. These examination priorities provide valuable insight into what OCIE perceives to be the greatest risk to investors and what it will be focusing its efforts on throughout the year. This year its overall goals stayed approximately the same as last year: 1) protecting investors saving for retirement; 2) assessing market-wide risks; and 3) using data analytics to identify and examine illegal activity.

In regards to its goal of protecting investors saving for retirement, OCIE intends to continue its Retirement-Targeted Industry Reviews and Examinations (“ReTIRE”) initiative which focuses on the suitability of investment recommendations made to investors, supervision and compliance procedures, conflicts of interest, and marketing practices. It will also continue to review the supervision procedures of branch offices of SEC-registered entities and fee selections which can lead to reverse churning. New areas of focus include exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”) which OCIE intends to examine for compliance with various regulatory requirements. It will focus on sales strategies, trading practices, disclosures, excessive portfolio concentration, and suitability, and will pay particularly close attention to niche or leveraged/inverse ETFs. In addition, variable annuities have become a large part of many investors’ retirement plans and OCIE intends to assess the suitability of these sales as well as the adequacy of disclosures. Lastly, OCIE will examine public pension advisers to ensure these advisers are not engaging in any pay-to-play activities or giving undisclosed gifts in return for appointments or other favors.

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The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) recently published guidance on the characterization of mutual fund fees, specifically 12b-1 distribution fees and sub-accounting fees, as part of their ongoing Distribution-in-Guise Initiative. Pursuant to Rule 12b-1 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, payments made by mutual funds (“funds”), to financial intermediaries from fund assets for the distribution of fund shares must be paid pursuant to a Rule 12b-1 plan that has been approved and adopted by the fund’s shareholders and Board of Directors (“Board”). In recent years the SEC has noticed that there are various fees being paid to intermediaries, in addition to distribution fees, that are being characterized as non-distribution-related fees and are not being paid pursuant to a Rule 12b-1 plan. Those fees include sub-transfer agent fees, administrative sub-accounting fees, and other shareholder servicing fees (collectively “sub-accounting fees”).

While these sub-accounting fees may in some cases be valid non-distribution-related fees, if they directly or indirectly compensate at all for any distribution-related activities, they are improperly labeled. Because of the importance of this issue given that fund fees directly impact investor returns and inherently involve conflicts of interest, the SEC has published guidance to assist funds in ensuring that distribution-related fees are being properly labeled and disclosed in a Rule 12b-1 plan as required. This potential problem was brought to the SEC’s attention after a recent sweep examination of various market participants including mutual funds, investment advisers, transfer agents, and broker-dealers.

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A Denver-based alternative fund manager was recently charged by the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) with engaging in fraudulent behavior regarding the handling of its futures fund, The Frontier Fund (“TFF”).  The alternative fund manager, Equinox Fund Management LLC (“Equinox”), allegedly overcharged management fees to its investors and overvalued certain assets.

Equinox is registered as an investment adviser with the SEC and thus owes its investors certain fiduciary duties, one of which is to act in the best interests of its investors by being accurate and complete with its registration statements and SEC filings. Equinox, however, allegedly failed to meet those duties by misrepresenting in their TFF registration statements that management fees were based on the net asset value of the assets, when in reality they were based on the notional trading value of the assets. The notional trading value takes into account both the amount invested and the amount of leverage used in the underlying investments, and is significantly higher than net asset value.

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Filing annual updating amendments to Form ADV is an important requirement for all registered investment advisers. All information contained in Parts 1 and 2 of Form ADV must be both accurate and complete. Unfortunately, this is not always the case, and the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and state regulators have not hesitated in bringing enforcement actions against investment advisers who misrepresent or fail to disclose certain information in their annual filings and amendments.

Based on 1170 routine state-coordinated investment adviser examinations in 2015, as reported by the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”), the most common errors that are routinely found on Form ADVs include inconsistencies between Form ADV Part 1 and Part 2, inconsistencies between fees charged and fees listed on the ADV, inconsistencies between services provided and services described in ADV, misrepresentations in business description, overstatements or understatements of assets under management, and failure to disclose conflicts of interest.

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Last week we discussed the Lucia matter and the parameters it added for investment advisers to consider prior to utilizing performance advertisements. Today we will discuss two more administrative proceedings involving performance advertisements and the practical implications which can be taken from these cases.

The matter of Virtus Investment Advisers revolved around one of Virtus’ sub-advisers, F-Squared Investments. F-Squared was an investment adviser that had previously been fined by the SEC for allegedly advertising false inflated performance numbers of its most successful investment strategy, AlphaSector. AlphaSector consisted of an algorithm-based sector rotation strategy which traded nine industry exchange-traded funds from the S&P 500 Index. Virtus’ assets under management which utilized this strategy grew from $191 million at the end of 2009 to 11.5 billion by 2013. Unfortunately, F-Squared allegedly falsely stated that the AlphaSector strategy had a history dating back to 2001 and that it had historically outperformed the S&P 500 Index from 2001 to 2008. The SEC found that no assets had tracked the strategy from 2001 to 2008 and its back-tested performance data was miscalculated and substantially overstated results.

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Pursuant to Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) and Rule 206(4)-1, it is considered fraud for a registered investment adviser to publish, circulate, or distribute any advertisement which contains any untrue statement of material fact or which is false or misleading. One type of advertising that has been the focus of recent regulatory activity is performance advertising.

Performance advertisements are generally used by investment advisers to portray their past performance results to prospective clients. In order to be avoid misleading the prospective client, all material facts regarding the performance data and how it was calculated must be disclosed. This includes disclosing any material market conditions, the amount of advisory fees or other expenses that were deducted, whether results portrayed include reinvested dividends and other earnings, the investment strategies which were used to obtain the results, and any other material fact which may have impacted the results in any way.
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Investment advisers continue to get into regulatory trouble when it comes to failing to disclose conflicts of interest and related party transactions as required by both federal and state investment adviser law. Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated proceedings against Fenway Partners, a New York-based registered investment adviser which served as adviser to three private equity funds. The conflicts arose around two related entities: Fenway Partners Capital Fund III, L.P., an affiliated fund, and Fenway Consulting Partners, an affiliate largely owned by the executives and owners of Fenway Partners.

Fenway Partners and Fenway Consulting Partners were both owned and managed in large part by respondents Peter Lamm, William Smart, Timothy Mayhew, and Walter Wiacek. The fund in question, Fund III, was operated by an Advisory Board consisting of independent limited partner representatives, pursuant to its organizational documents. According to the SEC allegations, the respondents failed to disclose several conflicts of interest and related party transactions to both the Advisory Board of Fund III and their fund investors.
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